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Introduction
The question of human agency as an ethical concern is applicable to the events of human
history. Discussing this question is necessary, for if one does not consider a human being’s
ability to function, then the result is an inevitable diminishing in human empathy and sympathy
for the past and its inhabitants. This could then lead to a lack of empathy and sympathy for
contemporary humankind. To demonstrate this process, one may look no further than the
example of the Holocaust, or Shoah, of the Second World War during the National Socialist
(NS) occupation of Germany. Ronald J. Berger’s work Agency, Structure, and Jewish Survival of
the Holocaust: A Life History Study exemplifies this perfectly as he speaks on the issue of
agency whilst using two different examples of Jewish agency. Berger argues that “Successful
agency, however, was in large part a collective accomplishment and dependent on factors
beyond individuals’ control.”1 While I do not disagree with Berger’s claim, I do believe that the
restriction of agency is determined on a particular scale involving the individual. The only way
for one to eliminate another being’s agency entirely is to kill them. That is why, until the
moment of one’s death, every human being is capable of agency, which can only be limited, as
Berger says, by “factors beyond individuals’ control.”
The Holocaust is such an interesting case because the National Socialists were unable to
accomplish their goal as one third of European Jews were able to avoid capture and death
entirely whilst living in occupied territory. Thus, there is evidence that the National Socialists
were unable to restrict the agency of the Jewish people in their entirety, as evident by Jews from
various backgrounds, exerting what remaining agency they had left to defy the NS regime to
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their greatest capacity. Full genocide was thwarted by individual efforts which can illustrate a
picture of collective defiance. Utilizing Berger’s definition of agency as, “the capacity to exert
control and even to transform to some extent ‘the social relations in which one is enmeshed.’”2
Focusing my attention to after 1939 in ghettos and camps, I will investigate period sources such
as ghetto witness accounts, orders, and diary entries. This will allow for a comprehensive
depiction of Jewish agency as neither entirely heroic, as Berger tries to avoid, or lachrymose, as
painted by popular depiction.
Defining Terms
To define agency without a proper connection to its relationship with resistance would be
foolish, as many instances of Jewish agency could be interpreted as resistance against agents of
National Socialist regime. However, Berger’s definition of agency, as stated previously, and this
analysis of individual accounts and narratives seem unable to be classified within two major
contemporary terms in German historiography that define different forms of resistance;
Widerstand and Resistenz. Both were coined by scholar Martian Broszart in his Bayern in der
NS-Zeit. Widerstand is denoted as a physical, purposive, direct, and sometimes violent,
counteraction against the state. Resistenz describes steps that are taken quietly as to subvert the
ruling power in a way that poses less of a risk to one’s life physically. Agency in the Holocaust,
as expressed by Jews, cannot fit seamlessly into either one of these categories. Instead every
action could be classified as either Widerstand or Resistenz as National Socialists inflicted
punishment onto Jews or forced them to commit certain acts. This is the determining factor in
why analyzing Jewish agency during the Holocaust is important, as we barely begin to scratch
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the surface of human decision-making when thousands of people are forced to commit particular
acts so much so that one’s very survival could be determined as an act of resistance.
I have been using the terms “Jew(s)” and “National Socialist(s)” to distinguish between
two groups that appear to be historically opposed in hierarchical structure. However, the
accuracy of using such terms is problematic. Not all National Socialists condemned “Jews” to
death or oppression; some, however, eagerly participated. Nor were National Socialists the only
ones to force “Jews” into submission. Thus, for the rest of this essay, when speaking about those
who were physically responsible for the oppression and deaths of determined “Jews” I will refer
to them as non-Jewish perpetrators. Unless made explicitly clear, National Socialist(s), or NS,
will only be used when speaking about policy carried out by the party or clearly denoted military
affiliates. As for a universally accepted definition of “Jew”, scholars are still trying to find one.
For the sake of simplicity and distinction for this essay, I will look to how non-Jewish
perpetrators determined the term “Jew.” Such designations went beyond even the laws of the
National Socialist regime. This definition says something about the level of agency Jews had as a
collective group. They were not even allowed enough agency to distinguish themselves as either
being “Jewish” or anything else, to deny “Jewishness.” It did not matter if one was Orthodox or
Secular, Reformed, Conservative or Convert. If the perpetrators determined one to be a Jew, then
they were targeted.
National Socialist Policy
The diminishment of agency would not have been possible without the implementation of
NS policies which contextualize agency restriction throughout the Holocaust. Reinhard Heydrich
was the Director of the Reich Main Security Office from 1939 to 1942. He and Heinrich
Himmler arguably the leading architects behind the Holocaust, as supported by many obtainable
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documents. One of which was his “Policy and Operations Concerning Jews in the Occupied
Territories.” In this document Heydrich outlined his plans for Jewish internment in concentrated
cities (ghettos) and the establishment of “Councils of Jewish Elders.”3 This section states that
“The Council is to be made fully responsible, in the literal sense of the word, for the exact and
prompt implementation of directives already issued or to be issued in the future.”4 This order
could have easily been taken as a preventive measure to ensure that the oppression of Jews
would continue within ghetto communities. However, this would later allow NS officials to
further order the council to, unknowingly, evacuate groups of Jews to death and work camps
where they would either be killed immediately or worked until death. This order does not
mention evacuation or the systematic killing specifically. However, the entirety of Wannsee
Protocol written in 1942 speaks upon the operations to evacuate Jews. It states that,
Another possible solution of the problem has now taken place of emigration, i.e. the evacuation of the Jews
to the East… Approximately 11 million Jews will be involved in the final solution of the European Jewish
question…The begging of the individual larger evacuation actions will largely depend on military
developments.5

These orders where given in succession in 1939 and 1942 respectively and they demonstrate the
progression, restriction, and oppression by non-Jewish perpetrators. This oppression of course
would not cease, as evident by the Auschwitz Protocols by Alfred Wetzler and Rudolf Vrba
which state explicitly that the total number of Jews killed between April 1942 and April 1944 at
Auschwitz, was approximately 1,765,000.6 This is the world in which Jews had to fight to
survive, and in doing so were forced by perpetrators to commit desperate acts. Some of these acts

Reinhard Heydrich, “Policy and Operations Concerning Jews in the Occupied Territories,” The Third Reich
Sourcebook, ed. Anson Rabinbach (Berkley: University of California Press, 2013) 749-750.
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2013) 753-755.
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might be characterized as heinous under normal circumstances. However, the circumstances
were anything but normal for Jews during German occupation. The questionable ethics that were
applied during this period leads into serious inquiries regarding personal agency.
Constraining Situations
One must consider the roles and opportunities that Jews had inside and outside of the
ghettos to help determine the degree of agency that individuals held. It should be noted that, one
individual does not represent the agency of the entire European Jewish population. Yet, it is
looking at individual cases that one will come closer to understanding the unique positions of
Jews working within the confines of persecution. One such individual was Dr. Israel
Milejkowski who had conducted a remarkable study of hunger in the Warsaw Ghetto. In his
“Evaluating the Ghetto” Milejkowski described the limitations of the ghetto while at the same
time acknowledging the important role of survival in the ghetto.
The chief curse of the ghetto is that there we can not be creative. Under brutal outside pressure we have lost
the possibility and also the qualities of creativity… one thing is terribly clear: the ghetto demoralizes! What
is a blessing for the ghetto-smuggling, for example- is from the national standpoint a curse.7

Milejkowski went on to suggest that the generation to come out of these smugglers would be
considered deplorable, and he gave no information on whether they were able to move out of the
ghetto by covert means. His idea of future generations, however, does not impact the choices and
free agency that these smugglers have in comparison to other residents of the ghetto. They were
able to provide luxuries that would have previously been taken for granted before the occupation.
Even Dr. Milejkowski himself would go on to provide for the ghetto in a way that non-Jewish
perpetrators were unable to control. However, Milejkowski arguably had more agency than

Hillel Zeitlin and Israel Milejkowski, “Evaluating the Ghetto,” The Third Reich Sourcebook, ed. Anson Rabinbach
(Berkley: University of California Press, 2013) 762-763.
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others, such as Zalmen Gradowski, who were forced to escort other Jews to the gas chambers.
Gradowski had witnessed extraordinary amounts of death as he was assigned this task by NS
officers. His particular case shows how Jewish agency diminished throughout the Holocaust
from the ghettos to the gas chambers. In his testimony he speaks solemnly about the final words
of a group of female victims.
Others spoke to us quietly and calmly: “We’re still young. We want to live, just a little more life.” They
weren’t pleading with us, for they knew that we were victims just like themselves. They simply spoke,
spoke just like that, because their hearts were heavy and before they died they wanted to tell their sorrow to
those who would survive them.8

Gradowski counts himself among the victims. Obviously, he would not be among those he had
just escorted to be killed, but he assumed that these women are speaking not out of a plea, but for
the sake of venting their sorrow to those who would understand. Transporters like Gradowski
were among those persecuted and whose agency had significantly been diminished. With what
little agency he had left, he could not have improved the situation of those he had led to the
camps, as his capability as an individual would not have been enough. This does not mean that
he was completely unable to do anything, for there are many cases, even within Gradowski’s
testimony, that suggest differently, which will be spoken about later. The capabilities of those
that Milejkowski and Gradowski describe are largely different. Yet, they both bring up questions
of how Jews responded to their new environment and forced submission by the non-Jewish
perpetrators.
Demonstrations of Limited Agency
Ethical concerns must be raised regarding forced participation of Jews in the destruction
and systematic oppression of their loved ones and compatriots. Stefan Ernest raises such

Zalmen Gradowski, “The Czech Transport,” The Third Reich Sourcebook, ed. Anson Rabinbach (Berkley:
University of California Press, 2013) 807.
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concerns as he debates the actions of Adam Czerniaków, president of the Warsaw Ghetto
Council, after he had committed suicide as an act of protest against non-Jewish perpetrators.
Ernest condemns the action of the president stating that “[He] committed a major error, possibly
even an act of cowardice…[He] should have lived and led the rebellion…For the sake of honor
he should have let them assume responsibility for shedding their own blood.”9 Was
Czerniaków’s suicide an act of a final choice, or was it a restriction of others’ agency, as Ernest
suggests? Did he effectively slow the killing of more Jews as a sacrifice, or did he give into the
goal of non-Jewish perpetrators? This case, due its ethical conundrum, is what I argue to be one
of the closest possible cases of complete erasure of one’s agency, second only to death.
Although, there are similar cases in which another in the same position did not commit suicide.
One might argue that those who were led into the gas chambers at death camps would have had a
similar, if not worse, restriction of agency. A counter to this is that the victims held some sense
of agency once they realized the inevitability of their own death. Once again in Gradowski’s
accounts he tells of disrobed women who try to persuade the officers into touching them before
they were killed. Gradkowski specifically mentions the stories of two women in his journal. One
of which, after a rebuking speech toward the officers, spat in the face of a female SS officer
before going into the crematoria.10 Another women also rebuked the officers, only this time,
attacked the director of the crematoria which resulted with her being clubbed, after which she
calmly and willfully went to her death. In both instances neither women had to deal with the
ethical conundrum of dealing with the lives of others. They only had themselves and still had the
choice to take, what was deemed as, impactful action against their oppressors. As Gradowski

Stefan Ernest, “Warsaw Ghetto Diary,” The Third Reich Sourcebook, ed. Anson Rabinbach (Berkley: University of
California Press, 2013) 765.
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states, “The officers stood silent, stunned…They had let her speak even though they knew what
she would say, compelled to listen to this Jewish woman on her way to die.” We cannot know
with certainty if Gradowski’s account is accurate, but even if this particularly detailed case did
not happen, there is still a likelihood that something similar to it did. He too was a Jew and
would have likely felt responsibility to some degree. The next question to ask would be what
restrictions had Gradowski encountered that would have determined his level of agency.
Unfortunately, Gradowski does not speak about himself enough to speak about his level of
agency.
One must consider the gendered aspect of Gradowski’s testimony as well. He speaks on
behalf of a group of women who could not speak for themselves. One cannot expect to receive
testimony from any of the victims unless they survived due to extraordinary circumstances.
Otherwise the evidence presented is already skewed in favor of a male perspective. Visiting the
role that gender has played within accounts of Jewish oppression, one can find a great example
in the testimony of Stefania Staszewska. Staszewska had been transferred from the Warsaw
Ghetto and recounts witnessing its fiery destruction due to conflict involving agents of the NS
regimen and armed resistance. Due to unfortunate circumstances Staszewska and others are
accused of escaping and are escorted to be, to her knowledge, executed. In the meantime, a
young boy from her group tries to run away,
One boy tries to escape and takes a series of bullets in the stomach. He runs a few more meters, curling up
like a cat. He’s writhing with pain; the Germans order us to carry him by his arms and legs to the
Befehsstelle…The wounded boy is howling with pain; his brother asks the Germans to put him out of his
misery but they just laugh. “You’ll all look like that in a minute.”11

Stefania Staszewska “Warsaw Ghetto Diary,” The Third Reich Sourcebook, ed. Anson Rabinbach (Berkley:
University of California Press, 2013) 779.
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Once again, we have an example of a person speaking about an instance that happen to someone
else of the opposite sex. A significant difference between Staszewska and Gradkowski is that in
Staszewska’s case, the NS officer that was spoken to responded with joking cruelty. She also
separates herself, as a Jew, from the soldiers, as denoted by her use of “Germans.” This is
important as she later refers to specific onlookers as “Poles” separating herself from both her
oppressors and bystanders. The deduction can be made that she is a Jew, but more importantly
one who makes the distinction between the three. This account seems to contradict efforts made
by Jews before the NS occupation to unify Jewish and German identities for themselves and to
fight against prevailing Anti-Semitic attitudes. Staszewska has added yet another layer of
complexity to this debate. The ethical component to specific narratives of Jewish agency
underscores an entire subfield regarding Jewish resistance.
Ethical Conundrums & Religious Denunciation
In his article “Jewish Resistance” Robert Rozzet gives a historiographical overview of
scholarship regarding Jewish resistance to National Socialists and non-Jewish perpetrators alike.
Rozzet states that,
Many early writers considered armed resistance to the Nazis to be the only legitimate response for Jews,
who had shed their Diaspora-like behavior. Those who did not resist with arms (or at least flee in the face
of the Nazi onslaught) were denigrated, and they were bunched together under the rubric of having gone to
their deaths ‘like sheep to the slaughter’. This became a common view in Israel of the behavior of Jews
during the Holocaust.12

This historical line of inquiry since its inception seems to disregard any accounts that would
advocate for the “passive” nature of interned Jews. Granted, rebellion and rescue are serious

Robert Rozzet, “Jewish Resistance,” In The Historiography of the Holocaust, edited Dan Stone (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) 341-342.
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topics of consideration when looking at agency. However, collective agency utilizing an act of
rebellion or rescue could not have been accomplished without outside help, pre-planning, or
spontaneous group insurrection. When one breaks events down to an individual level judgment
becomes comprised as situations become grayer. Take the earlier example of Adam Czerniaków
in the Warsaw Ghetto. He believed his unfortunate action would be suicide. On a strictly
individual level one could argue that his suicide was a final act of agency that would release him
from oppressive control by his superiors. However, the strikingly harsh result of his death was a
contribution to the end goal of the NS regime and non-Jewish perpetrators. To them he was
likely just one more dead Jew. What complicates matters further is that Czerniaków had to
consider the lives of other Jews within the ghetto. Perhaps his suicide was to serve a larger
purpose of slowing down forced relocation of Jews to concentration and death camps. If this was
the case, then his agency was still restricted up until he died, for he made a choice out of a
pressured circumstance. Not only that but whether he did something or nothing, he would have
restricted the agency of fellow Jews. This is arguably a worse situation than those heading into a
gas chamber of their own fruition without having to choose whether others live or die. Pressured
suicide resulting from a forced ethical choice is not a justified final act of agency. To quote
womanist theologian Eboni Marshall Truman, “If one’s whole life is already on a trajectory of
death, how redemptive is the use of death for political activism?”13 Czerniaków would not have
known what his death might have led to, all that anyone can say is that his suicide was a tipping
point.

Michelle Wolff, “Madonna and Child of Soweto: Black Life Beyond Apartheid and Democracy,” Political
Theology, vol. 19, no. 7, (2018) 586.
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Conclusion
The argument that the National Socialist’s goal of complete genocide was in part
thwarted by individual efforts illustrating collective defiance is entirely supported by the fact that
no human being can be limited to having absolutely no choice. To inquire about individual cases
is to also create an ethical basis for analyzing collective action in examples of rebellion, rescue
operation, or escape attempts, as Rozzet’s article points to. This claim obviously delves into the
realm of philosophy, but it is a question that must be addressed to help adequately describe the
experiences of historical figures and oppressed groups. It raises questions like whether suicide is
a valid final expression of agency under given circumstances. When asking about historical
inquiry we must begin to look to the voices of those who lives where complicated by an
oppressive force. Doing so helps gauge action that was taken, so that in future situations actions
like it could either be followed or avoided. Exemplifying Jewish agency speaks to the principles
of inclusive scholarship. By viewing and investigating these narratives we limit the risk of
overwhelming apathy to history as well as to the contemporary era.

